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Abstract
Catastrophic disasters, particularly a pandemic of influenza, may
force difficult allocation decisions when demand for mechanical
ventilation greatly exceeds available resources. These situations
demand integrated incident management responses on the part of
the health care facility and community, including resource manage-
ment, provider liability protection, community education and
information, and health care facility decision-making processes
designed to allocate resources as justly as possible. If inadequate
resources are available despite optimal incident management, a
process that is evidence-based and as objective as possible
should be used to allocate ventilators. The process and decision
tools should be codified pre-event by the local and regional
healthcare entities, public health agencies, and the community. A
proposed decision tool uses predictive scoring systems, disease-
specific prognostic factors, response to current mechanical
ventilation, duration of current and expected therapies, and
underlying disease states to guide decisions about which patients
will receive mechanical ventilation. Although research in the
specifics of the decision tools remains nascent, critical care
physicians are urged to work with their health care facilities, public
health agencies, and communities to ensure that a just and
clinically sound systematic approach to these situations is in place
prior to their occurrence.
Introduction
Current health care emergency preparedness planning recog-
nizes that excess critical care capacity for a disaster is
extremely limited. Most critical care units routinely function at
or near capacity [1-3], significantly decreasing available
critical care response capabilities for disasters [4-6]. These
limitations are not merely a consequence of space and
staffing issues; countless medical equipment and supplies
are maintained in quantities sufficient only for daily
operations. Unfortunately, usual medical material distribution
chains are vulnerable to disruption during disasters, so
additional supplies and equipment may not be readily
obtainable. For some equipment and medications, traditional
allocation units can be reduced and substitutions are possible
(for example, oral instead of intravenous medications) to allow
all in need to have adequate access to resources rather than
fewer to have unlimited access.
For a number of complex, durable medical devices such as
mechanical ventilators, there are few acceptable alternatives
[7,8]. In some circumstances, temporizing measures such as
manually ventilating patients may be adequate. Such a
strategy is likely to be inadequate for disasters requiring days
of ventilatory support, especially for people with severe
respiratory failure. Even if enough mechanical ventilators were
available to meet the need of hundreds or thousands of
additional critically ill patients in a community, critical care
personnel may be in too short of supply to withstand the
demands of pervasive disasters, like a severe influenza
pandemic. The critical care response to a severe influenza
pandemic will be further challenged by insufficient external
relief and augmentation assets; the critical care needs of all
communities may not be met [9-11]. Under these
circumstances, triage of patients who are newly requiring
critical care interventions and of those who have already
received some degree of definitive medical care may be
required in order to justly allocate the limited functional
capability of mechanical ventilation at a health care facility. To
optimize these decisions, there are several key constructs
that hospitals must discuss and predefine:
1. A well-practiced incident management system (for example,
Hospital Incident Command System) [12] that is con-
gruent with the National Incident Management System
[13] should be in place in area health care facilities and
public safety entities. A congruent standard of care within
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the institution as well as in the affected geographic area
can be achieved only by prioritizing resource allocation
and cooperatively working with local public health and
other agencies in an incident management framework
[10,14,15].
2. A clinical care committee (or other similar group within the
planning section) must work with the institution’s incident
commander on a daily basis. This group will determine
which services a health care facility will provide and what
adaptations must be made to provide these critical
services based on the demand and the resources
available [10].
3. A triage team composed of a few individuals with
expertise in critical care and relevant disciplines (for
example, infectious disease during a pandemic). To
determine how best to allocate the available assets, the
team can examine data from patients currently being
ventilated and those who require ventilation [10].
4. Decision tools that the triage team can apply in order to
minimize bias and thus most fairly allocate the ventilators
at the institution.
5. Formal processes and recommendations for palliative and
end-of-life care at the institution.
A few recent publications have examined both the process
[10] of decision-making and possible decision tools for burns
[16] and mechanical ventilation [9,11]. Prognostic data can
be used to triage patients after radiation exposures [17,18].
Research in trauma mass casualty triage is scant [19,20] and
is often based on military experience [21-23]. Pandemic
influenza triage has been examined in the context of
prediction of the need for hospital admission and mortality,
but not in terms of resource triage [24].
Given the heterogeneity of possible events and agents that
may result in large numbers of patients requiring critical care,
no single tool or scale can be expected to provide adequate
decision-making power. There are also many injury and
disease states (such as pandemic influenza) for which
decision tools will have to be developed and validated during
the event as evidence of disease epidemiology and patient
response to therapy accrues. The availability (or lack) of
accurate and rapid testing for certain diseases may also have
significant impact on the ability to predict outcome or make
definitive diagnoses [25,26].
Thus, the focus at the hospital level should be on establishing
the process that will be followed at the health care facility and
within the geographic region in a resource-scarce situation,
knowing that the specific decision support tool may be event-
driven. This is crucial because regardless of the origin of the
decision tool (national government, local/regional govern-
ment, specialty medical society, and so on) the implemen-
tation of the tool occurs at the hospital level. This article will
discuss a sample process for resource-scarce situations and
a prototype decision matrix for allocating ventilators.
Ethical and operational goals
Although in-depth consideration of the ethical and operational
issues involved in allocation decisions is beyond the scope of
this paper, a few key assumptions should be stated. The
reader is referred to other sources for additional discussion
[27-38].
• In a disaster situation, the focus of medical care shifts
from the needs of the individual (autonomy) to the needs
of the community as a whole (distributive justice) so that
the ‘greatest good for the greatest number’ is the goal.
Actual application of this ethical principle is complex and
is the subject of current debate and interpretation. It is
customary for the critical care physician to heavily weigh
patient and family wishes and subjective considerations in
determining ‘futile care’. This calculus is reversed during a
disaster so that the weight is on objective prognostic
criteria and less on subjective and individual patient
factors (Table 1). This shift in priorities will require
significant pre-event education and training for critical
care staff.
• An additional overall goal—which has received inadequate
attention—should be to provide patients as much comfort
and dignity as the situation allows regardless of other
interventions available.
• If a specific scarce resource that is life-saving or
potentially life-saving is not available in sufficient quantity
to meet patient demand despite all efforts to obtain
adequate resources from other local, regional, and
national partners in a timely manner and
– No temporizing measures are available (for example,
when manual ventilation is not an option) and
– Resource cannot be ‘titrated’ (for example, drugs or
oxygen) or substituted (for example, oral instead of
intravenous antibiotics) and
– All available resources and resource surrogates (for
example, bi-level positive airway pressure and
anesthesia machines) have been repurposed to
manage respiratory failure, but these efforts are
inadequate to meet the demand, then
– The overarching goal is to allocate facility resources to
those likeliest to benefit, taking into consideration
[39]:
• Medical prognosis
• Underlying disease
• Expected duration of resource need
• Duration of benefit
• Quality of life after intervention (unfortunately a
criteria subject to significant bias and
interpretation).
– Any other considerations involving weighing sub-
jective measures (for example, the role of the patients,
including health care workers, in the community) must
be determined by public discussion, and a means for
a lay panel/team to assess these factors must be
available if the community determines that this is
important. Medical personnel should not applyPage 3 of 9
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subjective criteria in their decision-making. This is
consistent with the American Medical Association
position on scarce-resource allocation [39].
• Due to government control of practitioner licensure and
liability, any such system of resource allocation should be
part of a planned state/province or national government
response to an overwhelming emergency. As part of this
planned response, medical providers must be protected
legally for making these difficult decisions. Under no
circumstances should a health care facility be in a
position of having to make systematic triage decisions
without activation of state or national emergency health
powers [10,40] to enable legal protection for providers
who in good faith are complying with pre-existing
response plans or event-specific state and jurisdictional
directives.
Allocation decision-making
The first goal of health care emergency preparedness
planning is to augment the actual capacity and capabilities of
the system [5,10,14,41-44]. Should this capacity prove
inadequate to meet the demands of a catastrophic disaster,
the secondary goal is to make the system ‘fault-tolerant’ or to
‘bend’ rather than ‘break’—making the minimum adaptations
necessary to cope with resource shortages (Table 2).
Many incidents with multiple victims may require some
degree of adaptation or resource triage. (For example, in a
car crash with multiple victims, who goes to computed tomo-
graphy or the operating room first?) However, these situa-
tions are generally mitigated rapidly and do not usually
require a systematic, ongoing, and institution-wide process to
determine what medical care can be provided based on the
demand and the resources available. Resource stockpiling,
staff cross-training, and altering staff responsibilities and
documentation requirements can help increase the capacity
for these incidents and thus prevent a resource-scarce
situation, as can timely resource requests based on antici-
pation of deficits prior to their actual occurrence [4,5,10,14,
41-44].
When an event is ongoing and when it is likely that resources
will continue to be inadequate to meet immediate or future
needs, changes to the usual process of patient care become
necessary to provide sufficient medical care relative to the
resources available and the patient demand. The goals are to
make the minimum adaptive changes necessary, with an
emphasis on administrative changes (for example, limiting
documentation and having non-clinical staff serve meals)
rather than clinical changes (for example, triaging persons
away from the emergency department and allocating limited
ventilators), and to reverse the adaptations as soon as
adequate resources become available [10].
As part of this response, mobilization of available health care
and non-health care personnel to provide patient care should
occur. Internally, staff should be reassigned and roles
redefined to maximize patient care time. External workforce
augmentation via agreements with the Medical Reserve
Corps and other sources of personnel augmentation (such as
Federal Disaster Medical Assistance Teams) should be
preplanned with relevant agencies. Also, this planning should
include appropriate just-in-time training for all personnel
taking on unfamiliar tasks and should credential, privilege,
and assign mentors to outside personnel assisting in the
institution. A clinical care committee or similar group (Table 3)
must review the facility resources and community needs and
determine what services will be offered, how and where these
services will be provided, and by what process triage
decisions will be made should that become necessary [10].
The process for institutional response (a sample of which is
detailed in Table 4) will vary depending on the size and
mission of the facility. For this to be successful, timely and
accurate unit and individual patient data must be available to
the committee. Note that this represents an ideal situation. In
times of disaster, the incident commander must be able to
account for the actions required to fairly institute such
protocols even if the full clinical care committee is
unavailable. However, the full committee as determined by
the institution is critical for effective planning, training, and
Available online http://ccforum.com/content/11/3/217
Table 1
Contrasting medical decision-making in resource-adequate versus resource-poor situations
Limiting medical care Resource-adequate situation Resource-poor situation
Focus Patient autonomy Community needs
Relationships Caregivers invested with family Caregivers unknown to family
Patient condition End of life NOT at end of life
Decision made Days to weeks Hours
Prior care Exhaustive Little to none
Subjective inputs Critical Minimal
Key decision-maker Family and caregivers ‘Triage’ physician or teamdrilling of the scarce-resource response to ensure that the
institutional plan is realistic and sound.
The importance of incident command awareness of and
facility with these situations and the adaptive structures and
mechanisms that exist at the institution cannot be
underemphasized. Furthermore, critical care staff should be
aware of the process for decision-making when demand
exceeds resources so that they are prepared to act, rather
than spend valuable time reacting to a completely new health
care paradigm.
Decision support tools
Determining which patients shall receive mechanical
ventilation when triage is required will be a difficult process
from both a clinical and a psychological perspective. There
are currently no models that provide a framework for
considering what we believe are three key areas that should
be evaluated when considering a patient for critical care
services:
• Organ system function (and severity of impairment)
• Duration of ventilator use and duration of benefit related
to:
– Disease-specific predictors (for example, pandemic
influenza)
– Underlying disease (for example, severe chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease)
• Response to a trial of mechanical ventilation (if received
based on above factors)
An ideal decision tool for allocating mechanical ventilation
would likely be graphically clean, easy to apply, objective,
accurate, reproducible, and predictive of resource use and
outcome and would not discriminate against vulnerable
populations. No such tool is available, but a matrix (developed
as a discussion draft for the Minnesota Department of Health)
that captures the core elements above is presented in
Figure 1. The matrix provides a supportive framework for
clinical decision-making but allows the ‘best method/
evidence available’ to be used within the matrix boxes and
adjusted on an ongoing basis.
A standardized method of assessing multi-organ function
(and failure) is a key step in determining prognosis, and
several scoring systems have significant ability to predict
mortality. Prior authors have suggested using the Sequential
Organ Failure Assessment (SOFA) [45] in a strategy
considering underlying disease and organ failure [9,11].
The SOFA score has wide validity across a range of patient
pathologies and is easy to calculate, using few laboratory and
no invasive hemodynamic variables. Changes in SOFA
scores over time may be of value in determining prognosis as
well [46-55]. Notably, SOFA and most scoring systems have
not been validated in pediatric populations. The SOFA score
provides an objective result relating to patient prognosis and
is a numeric that may be compared between institutions and
Critical Care    Vol 11 No 3 Hick et al.
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Table 2
Fault-tolerant systems
‘Fault-tolerance or graceful degradation is the property that enables a system to continue operating properly in the event of the failure of some of its
components. If its operating quality decreases at all, the decrease is proportional to the severity of the failure, as compared to a naively designed
system in which even a small failure can cause total breakdown. Fault-tolerance is particularly sought after in high-availability or life-critical systems’
[61].
Many systems must be engineered to be fault-tolerant. The same principles must be applied to critical services provided by hospitals during a
disaster. The following strategies can be applied to manage demand that would otherwise prompt system failure:
• Engineered system failure – Similar to a circuit breaker, this allows system components to fail in order to prevent catastrophic damage 
to the system as a whole. An example might be a hospital switchboard that gives preference to internal hospital calls (rather than to 
calls from external sources) to preserve internal communications during an emergency.
• Redundancy – Having adequate duplicate supplies or services available in case of failure (for example, extra intravenous pumps or 
ventilators).
• Diversity – Having many ways of providing the same service, but via different techniques (for example, triaging patients in multiple 
areas of the hospital: emergency department, lobby areas, and so on).
Table 3
Clinical care committee sample membership
A clinical care committee (the members are predetermined for toxic,
infectious, and trauma situations) is convened. During a pandemic, for
example, this committee might consist of some or all of the following at
a large facility [11]:
• Administrator or designee
• Medical director
• Infection control
• Infectious disease
• Critical care
• Emergency medicine
• Pediatrics
• Nursing supervisor
• Respiratory care supervisor
• Hospital ethicist (if possible)
• Legal counsel
• Community representative (if possible, similar to
Institutional Review Board role)
• Other (may include lab, radiology, bioelectronics, and
pharmacy)help inform regional resource allocation decisions. These
results may be of limited value during a pandemic, however,
as large numbers of patients may begin to cluster around
lower mean scores.
Unfortunately, because SOFA and other scoring systems
(APACHE [Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation],
MPM II [Mortality Probability Models II], and so on) were
derived and validated on cohorts, they are less accurate in
predicting the response of individual patients [56]. This
inaccuracy compounds the difficulty in deciding whom to
offer ventilation as there would need to be a substantial
difference (for example, 25%) in survival advantage predicted
by the scoring system to justify removing one patient from a
ventilator and giving the resource to another. Furthermore,
this use repurposes these prognostic systems to tasks for
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Table 4
Sample process for healthcare facility response during resource-poor situation
• Incident commander recognizes that systematic changes are or will be required to allocate scarce facility resources and that no regional
resources are available to offset demand.
• Planning chief gathers any guidelines, epidemiologic information, resource information, and regional hospital information.
• Clinical care committee reviews facility/regional situation and examines the following:
– Alternate care sites – Can additional areas of the building or external sites be used for patient care? (This should be planned in advance.)
– Medical care adaptations (for example, use of non-invasive ventilation techniques, changes in medication administration techniques, and
use of oral medications and fluids instead of intravenous).
– Changes in staff responsibilities to allow specialized staff to redistribute workload (for example, floor nurses provide basic patient care in
the intensive care unit while critical care nurses ‘float’ and troubleshoot) [5] and/or incorporate other health care providers, lay providers, or
family members where practical.
– Triage plan describing how the use of scarce resources at the facility (emergency department [ED] resources, beds, operating rooms, and
ventilators) will be allocated. (What level of severity will receive care? What tool or process will be used to make decisions when there are
competing demands for the same resource?)
– Community/regional strategies to cope with the situation and how the institutional response contributes to those efforts.
– Committee summarizes recommendations for next operational period and determines meeting and review cycles for subsequent periods
(may involve conference calls or similar means to avoid face-to-face meetings during a pandemic).
• Incident commander approves committee recommendations as part of incident action plan. Plan is operationalized. Public information officer
communicates updates to staff, patients, families, and the public.
• Current inpatients, patients presenting to the hospital, and their family members are given verbal and printed information (ideally by the triage
nurse in the ED or, for inpatients, by their primary nurse or physician) explaining the situation and that resources may have to be reallocated,
even once assigned, in order to provide care to those who will most benefit. A mechanism for responding to patient/family questions and
concerns should also be detailed.
• Security and behavioral health response plans should be implemented.
• Triage plan (which may affect all units equally or some more than others) implemented:
– ED/outpatient screening of patients (and denial of service to patients either too sick or too well to benefit from evaluation/admission)
based on guidance disseminated by the clinical care team.
– Tertiary triage team (ideally NOT the physicians directly providing the patients’ care and ideally two physicians of equal ‘rank’ in the
institution) considers situations in which there are competing patient demands for a scarce resource. The resource should be assigned as
follows:
When two patients have essentially equal claim to the resource, a ‘first-come, first-served’ policy should be used.
When, according to guidelines or the triage team’s clinical experience, the claim to the resource is clearly not equal, the patient with a
more favorable prognosis/prediction shall receive the resource.
The triage team should ask for and receive whatever patient information is necessary to make a decision but should NOT consider
subjective assessments of the quality of the patients’ life or value to society and, in fact, should ideally be blinded to such information when
possible.
• A ‘bed czar’ (under the Hospital Incident Command System, this is the inpatient unit leader) should be appointed to make final decisions on
bed assignments. This individual should have access to real-time inpatient and outpatient system status and, when needed, patient clinical
information.
• Whenever a decision is made to reallocate a ventilator or similar critical resource, the treating physician and family should be provided with the
grounds for the decision (which should be documented for the record at the facility) and a rapid appeals process if there is additional or new
information that the family or a treating physician feels would affect the decision.which they were not designed and which were not
considered during the original mortality ‘cut-score’
determinations. Thus, using a numeric score based on organ
function is not likely to be a satisfactory sole discriminator
(unless the difference between patient scores is large) since
it is not enough to ‘rank’ patients in order to place them on
available ventilators as there are likely none available.
Prospective validation of the use of the SOFA score and
other scoring systems for these purposes should be a focus
of research efforts. Awaiting better prognostic tools, we
would recommend the SOFA score due to its ease of
calculation and its reliance on a minimum of laboratory
testing.
Duration of benefit and duration of resource need are likely to
involve more subjective interpretation of data and are thus
more fraught with ethical peril. However, we feel that these
considerations are important when determining ventilator
allocation.
Assessment of likely duration of benefit and duration of need
for ventilation must account for both current disease-specific
prognostic factors and underlying disease states (particularly
ones that severely shorten life span or impact quality of life).
Prognosis is easier to estimate for some pathologies
(pulmonary contusion from trauma and severe burns) but less
so for disease states such as pandemic influenza, in which
the age groups affected, response to treatment, and other
factors are unknown. Assessment of expected duration of
mechanical ventilation aims to successfully manage more
patients with the same resource over a prolonged event, thus
offering greater community benefit, but may be invoked only
when there is a clear-cut difference between patients (for
Critical Care    Vol 11 No 3 Hick et al.
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Figure 1
Decision matrix for ventilator allocation during resource-poor situation.
Ventilator reallocated Patient keeps ventilator
1. Organ system functiona High potential for death according Intermediate potential for death  Low potential for death according 
to predictive modela according to predictive model to predictive model
2. Duration of benefit/prognosis a. Poor prognosis based on  a. Indeterminate/intermediate  a. Good prognosis based on 
epidemiology of specific  prognosis based on epidemiology  epidemiology of specific 
disease/injury (for example,  of specific disease/injury disease/injury
pandemic influenza)
b. Severe underlying disease  b. Severe underlying disease with  b. No severe underlying disease
with poor short-term prognosisb poor long-term prognosis and/or 
ongoing resource demand (for 
example, home oxygen-dependent, 
dialysis-dependent)
3. Duration of need Long duration – for example,  Moderate duration – for example,  Short duration – flash pulmonary
acute respiratory distress  pneumonia in healthy patient edema, chest trauma, other 
syndrome, particularly in setting  (estimate 3 to 7 days on conditions anticipating less than
of pre-existing lung disease  ventilator) 3 days on ventilator
(estimate more than 7 days on 
ventilator)
4. Response to mechanical  Worsening ventilatory  Stable ventilatory parameters  Improving ventilatory parameters
ventilation parameters over timec over time (judged by clinician as
failure to improve after adequate 
trial of mechanical ventilation
based on disease process)
Compared to other patient(s) requiring and awaiting mechanical ventilation, does this patient have significant differences in prognosis or resource
use in one or more categories above that would justify reallocation of the ventilator?
aThe SOFA (Sequential Organ Failure Assessment) score is a currently preferred scoring system based on type of data required and ease of
calculation.
bExamples of underlying diseases that predict poor short-term survival include (but are not limited to) the following: congestive heart failure with an
ejection fraction of less than 25% (or persistent ischemia unresponsive to therapy or ischemia with pulmonary edema); acute renal failure requiring
hemodialysis (related to illness); severe chronic lung disease, including pulmonary fibrosis, cystic fibrosis, or obstructive or restrictive diseases
requiring continuous home oxygen use prior to onset of acute illness; immunodeficiency syndromes with evidence of opportunistic pathogen
infection; central nervous system, solid organ, or hematopoietic malignancy with poor prognosis for recovery; cirrhosis with ascites, history of
variceal bleeding, fixed coagulopathy, or encephalopathy; acute hepatic failure with hyperammonemia; acute and chronic and irreversible
neurologic impairment that makes patient dependent for all personal care (for example, severe stroke, congenital syndrome, persistent vegetative
state, and severe dementia).
cChanges in oxygenation index (OI) over time may provide comparative data, though of uncertain prognostic significance. OI = MAWP ×
FiO2/PaO2, where MAWP is mean airway pressure, FiO2 is inspired oxygen concentration, and PaO2 is arterial oxygen pressure. PaO2 may be
estimated from peripheral oxygen saturation by using the oxygen dissociation curve if blood gas measurements are unavailable.example, pulmonary edema secondary to missed hemo-
dialysis versus acute respiratory distress syndrome [ARDS]).
Though important, these predictions are imprecise and often
may be subject to bias.
Consideration of significant underlying disease states and
their effect on patient life span, quality of life, duration of
resource benefit, and resource demands is important for
determining whether there is a substantial difference between
the patients requiring the therapy, but is most subject to
interpretation bias and is least specific. Triage based on
underlying disease states aims to ventilate patients who do
not have diseases that would predict a protracted or poor
response to treatment or limited duration and scope of
benefit following recovery. Use of hospice and other well-
defined ‘quality of life’ standards and longevity predictors may
be helpful strategies, and this is being explored currently by a
task force in King County, WA, USA (L Rubinson).
Patients already on a ventilator or those who are offered a
trial of mechanical ventilation (and it should be viewed as a
therapeutic trial rather than a resource ‘assignment’ in a
resource-scarce situation) should be reassessed on an
ongoing basis. If their condition (and prognosis) continues to
worsen (or simply fails to improve after an appropriate
duration of time given their disease state), this should be
weighed when considering whether to continue ventilatory
support. An objective tool to assess response to mechanical
ventilation is needed and should be developed. The
oxygenation index has been correlated with mortality in
certain groups and is one of the few calculations available
that may have utility as an objective marker as it changes over
time. Although its applicability to triage is unknown, a
worsening oxygenation index over time may provide helpful
information to the critical care physician and triage team
about the benefit of mechanical ventilation [57-60].
Thus, triage team members need to compare a variety of
factors when making a decision about ventilator allocation.
For example, if patient ‘A’ is the most marginal of currently
ventilated patients (based on assessment of current
prognostic and other variables) and now patient ‘B’ requires a
ventilator (but none are available), one must determine
whether, based on the matrix, there is a clear-cut reason that
patient A should be taken off the ventilator so that patient B
can receive it. The clinician proceeds stepwise through the
tool to compare the patients. If there is a clear-cut difference
found favoring patient A or B (for example, green versus red
category), an allocation decision can be made. But if there
are no green versus red discriminators, the matrix tool results
as a whole should be considered (for example, blue versus
red in several categories) in order to determine whether there
is a clear-cut balance favoring one patient over the other.
Unless (in the opinion of the team) there is a substantial
advantage favoring patient B once these factors are weighed,
patient A continues on the ventilator.
Note that if patient B were on the ventilator, the same
assessment might yield a determination that patient B should
stay on the ventilator. Because the outcome of a decision to
terminate ventilatory support results in harm (likely death), the
difference in prognosis/demand/duration likewise should be
clear-cut for ventilator reassignment to occur; otherwise,
‘first-come, first-served’ applies.
Teams may find it helpful to track patient data and history
factors on the matrix tool so that these can be maintained for
ongoing comparisons/updates and changes tracked easily
over time. Note that as clinical conditions change, patients C
or D may become the most marginal recipient of therapy and
thus would be the basis for comparison rather than patient A.
It is extremely important that the triage team be aware of
evolving changes in patients’ clinical conditions and be able
to maintain a relative ‘rank list’ of intensive care unit patients
on ventilators relative to their clinical condition and other
variables.
The science of triage (in particular, tertiary triage) is nascent,
and we believe that our suggestions above will soon be
replaced by more robust and researched strategies.
Predictive models that are more specific may be introduced
into the ‘disease-specific prognosis’ category (for example,
neurotrauma, burns, and ARDS). The matrix allows better
predictive systems to be incorporated without changing the
basic framework or factors considered. This matrix may also
be used to consider whether to offer other therapies to
patients (such as intensive care admission), but there may be
other simpler tools that rely on clinical assessment and that
could be used in an emergency department setting to
accomplish this type of secondary triage (after initial
stabilization).
Additionally, although the matrix attempts to incorporate
relevant variables for triage of mechanical ventilation, it has
not been tested for reproducibility between practitioners and
patient groups, which limits its inherent validity. However, we
feel that this tool represents a significant step forward from
prior empiric efforts and reflects realistic considerations that
must be balanced when making these difficult decisions. It is
also a concrete reference point for discussions about limiting
care in resource-scarce situations, as theoretical discussions
about clinical care committees and the ethical basis of
withdrawing and withholding medical care may miss practical
issues and problems that the institution would face in such a
circumstance.
Conclusion
Critical care providers are in a position to help inform and
lead hospital discussions about resource allocation
decisions, critical care surge capacity, and the exercising of
these plans at their facility. Indeed, their absence from the
process predicts failure of the systems in crisis. Additionally,
critical care physicians must understand that the patients
Available online http://ccforum.com/content/11/3/217
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the usual caseload and must determine in advance as part of
their departmental plan how their limited nursing and
physician staff would be extended (consultative role,
documentation, and external consultations for hospitals not
used to providing long-term critical care) [5].
Finally, critical care physicians must exert leadership to
ensure that their institution is prepared for a situation in which
critical care resources, including mechanical ventilation,
would be inadequate to meet the community need.
Determining ‘futile care’ in the context of daily patient care is
far different from a resource-poor situation (Table 1), and
critical care physicians can assist their hospital ethics
committee and administration in developing plans and
providing education that will facilitate such a paradigm shift
should that become necessary. We urge that these
conversations begin now, so that should such a tragic
situation develop, providers and the public alike understand
our limitations, our goals, and the systems that we have
designed to make the best of our limitations.
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